For over 30 years, China Vanke Co.,Ltd. was revered as an industry icon, worshipped and pursued by many. It was part of elite groups like "Zhao Bao Wan Jin" and "Heng Wan Bi," remaining at the top through several industry transformations. To date, those who surpassed it in industry rankings have not met pleasant endings: Country Garden Holdings exceeded Vanke's sales scale in 2014, but is now among the defaulted real estate companies - one of the few state-owned enterprises to default and the largest in scale; Evergrande met the worst fate, directly liquidated and delisted, with no place left in the Hong Kong stock market and ultimately rejected by the A-share market, though it left a lasting impact as "Evergrande" became a phenomenon that continues to emerge across various industries, with the automotive sector already seeing its own "Evergrande"; Country Garden is still in its operational transition phase, crawling forward while busy with restructuring, with dismal profits and leading the industry in losses for several years... It's all about timing, fortune, and fate!
Vanke's reputation may have started turning during the 2016 Baoneng dispute. Many people were already dissatisfied with Vanke then, believing it lacked responsibility by allowing stock prices to fall and disregarding shareholders' and investors' interests, but Vanke ultimately pulled through. In 2017, founder Wang Shi stepped down as chairman, and the Yu Liang era began.
In 2018, when this round of industry adjustment was just beginning, Vanke seemingly sensationally proposed "survive," which many didn't understand, considering it anxiety-inducing and pretentious. Looking back now, Vanke's foresight in proposing "survive" at the crisis's onset was truly prescient. However, Vanke failed to take actual action, didn't scale back its pace, and didn't prepare for risk response.
In 2024, several open letters from Yantai partners brought many "unknown" matters to light, putting Vanke and management including Yu Liang and Zhu Jiusheng in the dock of public judgment, triggering a devastating crisis. Performance plummeted, management was in turmoil, debt mounted, and the company sought survival by joining Shenzhen Metro Group.
Vanke probably never imagined that seven years later, the words once spoken would be proven true, as it truly seeks ways to "survive." Would the outcome be different now if Vanke had followed through on its words seven years ago?
Vanke is truly struggling now! Sales performance is plummeting like a rocket. In 2023, sales reached 376.12 billion yuan, ranking second in the industry; in 2024, as Vanke entered its fourth decade, sales dropped to 246.02 billion yuan, a 35% decline, falling out of the top three to fifth place; from January to August 2025, performance hasn't reached 100 billion, only 91.11 billion, a 44% decline, with industry ranking dropping to sixth place; whether 2026 can see a turnaround remains to be continued...
Sales represent cash collection, and sales conditions reflect the company's cash flow situation to some extent. Operating cash flow net amount was 3.8 billion in 2024, positive for 16 consecutive years, but reversed in 2025, with first-half operating cash flow net amount at -3.039 billion yuan.
Vanke continues efforts to improve cash flow: on one hand, accelerating sales collection, dynamically controlling development pace, reasonably balancing income and expenditure, striving for positive operating cash flow while further leveraging the cash-generating function of operational service businesses; on the other hand, implementing convergence and focus, flexibly adopting market-oriented transfer, asset securitization, strategic investment attraction, and expanded cooperation strategies based on market conditions to fully realize asset value and supplement liquidity when appropriate.
Severe losses! 2024 was a turning point for Vanke's operations, marking the company's first historical loss, truly demonstrating that when it loses, it loses spectacularly. Full-year net profit attributable to listed company shareholders was a massive loss of 49.48 billion yuan, down 506.8% year-over-year, making it the A-share listed real estate company with the highest losses.
With three-quarters of 2025 passed, Vanke still hasn't escaped losses, achieving operating revenue of 105.32 billion yuan in the first half, down 26.2% year-over-year, with net loss attributable to listed company shareholders of 11.95 billion yuan.
Loss reasons include: (1) significantly reduced settlement scale of real estate development projects with low gross margin; (2) considering industry, market, and operational environment changes and increased business risk exposure, additional asset impairment provisions were made; (3) some bulk asset and equity transaction prices were below book value.
Still wanting to "survive" and working hard to "survive," it has contracted to ankle level, barely acquiring land! Since the 2024 turmoil began, Vanke initiated balance sheet contraction, divesting some assets and businesses. In the first half, 13 bulk transactions were completed covering office, commercial, apartment, and education sectors, with total contract value of 6.43 billion yuan.
2025 focuses mainly on inventory clearance, implementing specialized sales category management for existing properties, tail-end projects, parking spaces, and commercial-office properties. In the first half, initial existing property sales reached 17.6 billion yuan, quasi-existing property sales 18.3 billion yuan, commercial-office sales 8.1 billion yuan, with 69 tail-end projects cleared.
Truly scared now, afraid to acquire large-scale land. Contraction began in 2024, with only 13 new projects added for the full year, total planned floor area of 1.37 million square meters, equity planned floor area of 833,000 square meters, equity land price totaling approximately 5.56 billion yuan, less than a fraction of 2023 (2023 equity land price total was 46.32 billion yuan), down 88% year-over-year, meaning equity investment was cut to the ankle in one year, leaving only one-tenth.
Since 2025, even more cautious, acquiring only 10 parcels from January to August, planned floor area of 850,000 square meters, equity planned floor area of 508,000 square meters. Such land replenishment is difficult to maintain scale.
Land investment contraction can save expenses and reduce company pressure, but with consecutive two years of investment contraction, the pressure of value shortage will inevitably increase daily. If 2025 operations show no significant improvement, performance decline and position retreat are certain, and some missed opportunities may never return.
As of June 30, 2025, Vanke owned under-construction projects with total floor area of approximately 32.272 million square meters, equity floor area of approximately 21.166 million square meters; planned projects with total floor area of approximately 30.074 million square meters, equity floor area of approximately 19.265 million square meters, totaling 62.346 million square meters of land reserves, providing some performance support, but inventory problems remain difficult to resolve.
Continuous borrowing! No overseas public debt due in the next 2 years. First-half consolidated financial statements showed new financing and refinancing of 24.9 billion yuan (excluding shareholder loans); successfully completed 24.39 billion yuan public debt repayment, with no overseas public debt due before 2027.
In 2025, Vanke has sought help from Shenzhen Metro Group ten times, with total (proposed) loan amounts of 27.804 billion yuan. Since January 2025, cumulative shareholder loans from major shareholder Shenzhen Metro Group reached 23.877 billion yuan (excluding the latest 9.16 billion), with the best asset Onewo put to use.
February 10: 2.8 billion loan, providing assets worth up to 4 billion yuan as collateral, with pledge ratio set at 70%. Initially pledged Onewo stocks worth 4 billion yuan as guarantee.
February 21: 4.2 billion loan, using up to 6 billion yuan of Onewo stocks as collateral for the original loan contract.
March 20: 890 million loan.
April 29: 3.3 billion loan.
May 14: 1.551 billion loan, with Onewo stocks as collateral.
June 6: 3 billion loan.
July 3: 6.249 billion loan, approved by Shenzhen Stock Exchange.
July 30: up to 869 million loan, with proposed collateral assets valued at up to 1.298 billion yuan.
August 5: up to 1.681 billion loan, with final loan amount of 1.189 billion yuan.
September 16: Shenzhen Metro Group providing up to 2.064 billion loan...
Since Vanke's 2024 annual shareholders' meeting on June 27, 2024, Shenzhen Metro has indeed provided substantial support with batched funding arrangements as follows: new loans of 6.249 billion yuan, extended loans of 890 million yuan, new loans of 869 million yuan with asset collateral, new loans of 1.189 billion yuan (the August 5, 2025 board-approved loan amount was up to 1.681 billion yuan), and Onewo equity pledge guarantee for existing 1.551 billion yuan loan. The 6.249 billion yuan and 890 million yuan loans have been approved by Shenzhen Stock Exchange and are exempt from cumulative calculation when confirming whether related transactions require shareholder meeting approval.
Asset revitalization! 2025 continues multi-pronged approaches to activate existing assets: First, for plots with high commercial-office ratios, implementing "acquisition, regulation adjustment, re-listing" according to city needs; in September, signed acquisition agreement to return a 150-acre plot in Fuzhou High-tech Zone that had been idle for 12 years to the government; Second, resource exchange, swapping commercial-office assets for residential projects through bulk sales, such as exchanging 38,000 square meters of commercial assets in Chengdu for residential projects that have already opened for sale; Third, using special bonds to acquire existing land and commercial housing inventory, with 36 applications submitted to government and 15 included in municipal lists; Additionally, through project equity exit and self-operated sales, revitalizing resources and recovering funds, with a Hangzhou self-held residential property acquired by Hangzhou Anju for affordable rental housing.
First-half optimization and new capacity through existing asset revitalization reached 9.52 billion yuan, with cash collection from existing asset revitalization of 5.75 billion yuan. Since 2023, 64 projects have been cumulatively revitalized, involving saleable value of approximately 78.5 billion yuan, with new sales of approximately 22.6 billion yuan through revitalized projects.
Largest-scale structural adjustment in history! Since 2024, Vanke has undergone multiple organizational restructuring. March 2024: merged southern regional companies, reducing regional companies from 12 to 7; July 2024: further regional company reduction, with Northeast and Northwest regions downgraded to subsidiaries with only management functions; simultaneously adjusted Shanghai Company and Guangfo Company with obvious advantages, large value, and major projects to direct management by Development and Operations Headquarters.
July 2025 saw the largest-scale structural adjustment, dissolving all regional companies (East China, South, Beijing, Southwest, Central China - totaling five regional companies), with headquarters directly managing city companies with strong control. Shanghai's Development and Operations Headquarters will also relocate back to Shenzhen, with headquarters implementing direct control over frontline business.
Reduced management levels can improve communication efficiency to some extent, reduce unnecessary resource waste, and achieve cost reduction and efficiency improvement. The official website has updated the latest organizational structure: 13 centers + 16 regional companies + 8 business divisions. The structural adjustment suggests starting over, unifying thinking through structural changes for a fresh start.
Still supported by internet-famous projects. Vanke also has popular projects in 2025, such as Shanghai Jing'an's Zhongxing Aoshe, which opened its third phase in July 2025. Products range from 100+ to 355 square meters, meeting high-end improvement housing needs while targeting urban elite groups with ten-million-level budgets - core 10-million luxury homes are no longer a dream.
Since opening in 2024, cumulative sales have exceeded 10 billion yuan, becoming the second 10-billion project after Sunac Bund One. Additionally, several projects achieved ideal sales performance, with Wenzhou Pushi Yunzhou, Chengdu Duhui Jiadi, Chengdu Jinshang Yanghua, Tianjin Donglu and other existing asset revitalization projects achieving over 90% first-opening sell-through rates.
How difficult is it to recreate another Vanke? No one can deny that Vanke once performed excellently and has many aspects worth learning from. It's indeed very difficult now. If it can survive 2025, perhaps 2026 will be better, and many people still expect Vanke to recover and compete with "Bao Zhonghua" for first place.
No one can deny that the industry is different now: even if "Bao Zhonghua Zhao" replaces "Heng Wan Bi Rong," it's difficult to replicate past industry glory; even though we see Zhejiang Taizhou's "automotive mold king" going to Shanghai to acquire the national unit price land king (Xuhui Hengfu Style District), with outsiders speculating this is for "self-built housing" on Shanghai Bund, even guessing who will operate it; seeing Inner Mongolia's trillion-yuan coal baron Yitai Group boldly entering Shanghai Bund, taking over Evergrande's projects to build luxury housing; seeing Zhejiang's "button king" betting heavily on real estate, playing high-end in Hangzhou and Hefei; seeing world-class office and stationery giant Deli running land circles in real estate for 20 years, called the "invisible landlord"; seeing "textile king" Jiangsu Nantong Yalun making decisive moves, single-handedly forcing back national team players like Poly and China Resources to seize land; seeing many local small and medium private enterprises beginning to stir, including Sichuan's Liantou, Beijing's Maoyuan, Hangzhou's Jindi, Jiangxi's Jiaxin, Sichuan's Rundafeng Binjiang, Jiahe Xing...
But if Vanke falls, it would be very difficult to recreate another Vanke.