On the evening of September 5th, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released the "Administrative Regulations on Sales Fees for Publicly Offered Securities Investment Funds (Draft for Comments)." This initiative aims to further reduce costs for fund investors, standardize the public fund sales market, protect the legitimate rights of fund investors, and promote high-quality development in the public fund industry.
The public fund fee reduction reform officially launched in July 2023. The "first cut" primarily involved fund companies reducing management fees and custody fees. At the end of 2023, the "second cut" was introduced, targeting securities trading commission rates for public funds. This "third cut" directly addresses fees related to fund sales. Once implemented, the fee reform in the public fund industry will enter its final phase.
However, against the backdrop of industry-wide fee reductions, CM Bank, known as the "retail king," has quietly implemented a contrary strategy - raising fees significantly while others are cutting costs and offering benefits to investors.
Opening the CM Bank app reveals multiple funds with subscription fees as high as 1.5%, including Fuguo Research Selected Flexible Allocation A (000880) and Changxin Balanced Selection Mixed A (018071).
These same funds are available on the Tiantian Fund platform with a 90% discount, charging only 0.15%.
More notably, Huatai Zijin Value Selection Mixed A (019800) can be purchased through CM Bank at a 1.5% rate, while Ant Fortune clearly displays "At the request of the management company, to ensure stable fund operations and protect shareholder interests, this fund has suspended subscriptions."
The product appears to be "exclusively locked" by CM Bank, resembling markup selling rather than fund distribution.
Industry sources reveal that there have long been rumors within the sector that fund withdrawals from third-party platforms result from CM Bank's "exclusive cooperation conditions." Fund companies wanting their products included in CM Bank's priority distribution list must promise "exclusive sales of these shares through CM Bank" and cannot offer discounts on other platforms, or they won't receive CM Bank's channel support.
As the "retail king," CM Bank has consistently promoted being "customer-centric and creating value for customers." However, this operation appears contrary to creating value and seems more like capitalizing on market conditions. More critically, this completely contradicts regulatory requirements to "reduce investor costs" - while regulators repeatedly emphasize cost reduction and other institutions offer benefits, CM Bank takes the opposite approach.
Fund investors bear the greatest burden, not only paying higher fees but also having their choice of platforms restricted. Many young investors are accustomed to using platforms like Ant Fortune and Tiantian Fund for their convenience and cost-effectiveness, where they can easily check performance and compare fees. Now, with desired funds unavailable on these platforms, investors are forced to pay higher prices through CM Bank.
This strategy may be related to CM Bank's fund distribution performance pressure. In 2024, CM Bank's agency fund business revenue was 4.165 billion yuan, down 19.58% year-over-year, representing the largest decline within its wealth management segment. More concerning, its equity fund holdings were surpassed by Ant Fund, with Ant's equity fund holdings reaching 738.8 billion yuan compared to CM Bank's 410.5 billion yuan.
Therefore, leveraging the current A-share bull market, CM Bank appears to be using "exclusive sales" to lock in traffic and compensate for revenue losses through higher fees. However, regardless of strategic calculations, this approach should not burden fund investors with excessive costs.