Despite approaching the trillion-yuan threshold in total assets under management (AUM), CCB Fund's non-monetary fund scale—a key indicator of its investment prowess—has been shrinking persistently. Even with the backing of its parent company, CCB, the fund struggles to demonstrate independent value in a fiercely competitive market.

When a mutual fund firm relies heavily on shareholder resources for distribution channels, investment strategies, and product offerings, its credibility as an independent market player inevitably comes under scrutiny. CCB Fund’s current predicament epitomizes this structural dilemma.

Although the broader market has improved this year, with sectors like hard tech outperforming and many peers doubling their equity fund net values, CCB Fund’s non-monetary AUM has declined—from RMB 205.83 billion in early 2024 to RMB 180.20 billion by Q3 2025.

Weakened equity product performance and fee cuts have dragged down management fee income, which fell from RMB 2.36 billion in 2022 to RMB 2.09 billion currently, while net profit dropped from RMB 1.17 billion to RMB 844 million. Despite its privileged access to CCB’s resources, the fund has failed to deliver returns that justify its reliance on shareholder support, further exposing its limitations.

**Equity Product Gaps** Recent Q3 2025 disclosures show CCB Fund’s total AUM nearing RMB 1 trillion, driven largely by money market funds (MMFs). Its MMF scale grew by RMB 83.35 billion to RMB 783.43 billion, ranking second industry-wide. In contrast, non-monetary AUM shrank by RMB 25.63 billion to RMB 180.20 billion, slipping to 29th place.

Bond funds, once a strength, have also weakened—ranking 27th with RMB 128.19 billion. Equity funds remain the primary drag: stock funds fell to RMB 23.30 billion (25th place), while hybrid funds dropped to RMB 17.25 billion.

Despite offering nearly 100 equity products, most are small and underperforming. Of 59 stock funds, 47 have AUM below RMB 500 million; only two exceed RMB 3 billion. Similarly, 27 of 41 hybrid funds are under RMB 300 million. Poor returns have triggered a vicious cycle: 28 of 63 active equity funds trailed the CSI 300 over the past year, with 11 posting losses.

Concentrated bets have backfired. For instance, CCB臻选混合’s heavy allocations to real estate (17.68%) and liquor (13.26%) in 2022 led to a -11.22% return since inception, halving its AUM to RMB 2.08 billion. CCB兴润一年持有混合 similarly lost 22.42%, with AUM plunging to RMB 1.66 billion.

**Leadership Void** CCB Fund lacks star managers like Zhang Kun or Liu Yanchun, and its research team has seen talent drain. Veteran manager Tao Can oversees just RMB 6.15 billion (23.65% of active equity AUM), while departures like Jiang Feng (exited 2024) and Zhou Zhishuo (joined GF Fund in 2025) have further eroded capabilities.

**Fee Income Plunge** Equity products’ higher fees (1.0%-1.5%) traditionally drive profits, but CCB Fund’s shrinking scale has slashed revenue. Management fees from 57 equity funds collapsed by nearly 50% to RMB 342 million in 2024, while MMF fees grew to RMB 1.21 billion. Net profit fell for two straight years, dropping 24.59% in 2023 and 4.42% in 2024.

**Governance Concerns** CCB Fund operates more like a CCB subsidiary than an independent asset manager. Its leadership—all CCB veterans—lacks mutual fund expertise, stifling innovation. For example, current chair Sheng Liurong was CCB’s CFO, while president Xie Haiyu has no frontline investment experience.

Unlike peers like ICBC Credit Suisse or Bocom Schroders, which hire market-savvy executives, CCB Fund’s “outsiders-leading-insiders” model hampers competitiveness. With CCB’s ecosystem already covering bonds and MMFs via subsidiaries, CCB Fund risks becoming redundant unless it carves a distinct niche.